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  3. Karma Chameleon: The CCP turns to Buddhism
Weibo image of Xi Jinping visiting Hongjue Temple
The Little Red Podcast
01 October 2025

Karma Chameleon: The CCP turns to Buddhism

Omny Studios Apple Podcasts iHeart Spotify Tuneln YouTube

Transcript

Graeme Smith  00:06

Welcome to the Little Red Podcast, which brings you China from beyond the Beijing beltway. I'm Graeme Smith from the Australian National University’s Department of Pacific Affairs, and I'm joined by my co-host, Louisa Lim, former China correspondent for The BBC and NPR now the Centre for Advancing Journalism at Melbourne University. We're on air thanks to support from the Australian Centre on China and the World. And we’re coming to you from the lands of the Ngunnawal and Ngambri people and the Wurundjeri Woi Wurrung people of the Kulin nation.

 

Louisa Lim  00:36

This month, as part of our series on belief in China, we’re looking at the revival of Buddhism. Some figures show that temple visits have increased in recent years by more than 300 percent. Half of these visits are by young people, perhaps seeking divine help, given high unemployment rates and economic stress at home. But the state has embraced Buddhism too, using it both as a tool of pacification at home and a tool of diplomacy overseas.

 

Graeme Smith  01:07

This week, we're delighted to be joined by Associate Professor Gareth Fisher from Syracuse University, whose book is called Buddhism After Mao: Negotiations, Continuities and Reinventions. We’re also joined by Professor Chien-Peng Chung from Lingnan University in Hong Kong.

 

Clip  01:24

In an attempt to inculcate Chinese Kung Fu and culture among the Zambian citizens, the first ever Shaolin Temple has been opened in Lusaka, the Zambian capital. The establishment of the Shaolin Temple is a collaboration between China's Songshan Shaolin Temple and Huran, a Chinese run company in Zambia. Yan Lun, the headmaster of the temple, said the objectives of the project include teaching Shaolin Kung Fu, Chinese culture, helping understand the African culture, as well as enhancing the China-Africa friendship.

 

Louisa Lim  01:54

This Xinhua video shows students at the first ever Shaolin Temple in Africa. It opened in Zambia in 2021. Students learn Kung Fu for free, as well as Chinese language and culture. Here’s Yang Kun, the master of the Shaolin Temple in Zambia.

 

Clip  02:13

I'm very happy that they are so interested in Chinese Kung Fu and the Chinese culture and what I teaching them, and they get, they can understand very well, yeah. And they also benefit a lot from the Chinese culture.

 

Graeme Smith  02:33

Chien-Peng, let’s start with you. I saw one figure that there's something like 40 Shaolin cultural institutions around the world. I mean, is this just a business or is it a vehicle for Chinese soft power, do you think?

 

Chien-Peng Chung  02:47

The overseas is more of diplomatic tool for the Chinese government. I believe that the official name of the Shaolin Temple in Zambia is the Zambia Shaolin Cultural Centre. So, it's not just selling Buddhism, which you know, for the Chinese, is convenient, because it's both Chinese, right? It’s very sinicized. It’s been in China for 2000 years. But it’s also something very Asian. It’s also something very international. So, in addition to Buddhist religion, it’s also a Chinese Cultural Centre, in a way to piggyback Chinese culture onto the spreading of Buddhism, you know, by promoting Chinese culture, as we just saw in the programme. You know, the learning of Chinese language for chanting, of course. But also, you know, people are attracted to the temple or the cultural centre because, you know, they can learn Chinese. And maybe, you know, get some free food, you know, from that place as well, you know. So, it’s both religion and culture, specifically Chinese culture.

 

Graeme Smith  04:09

So, there's a follow up Chien-peng. I mean, I've seen Shaolin being taught everywhere from Papua New Guinea universities to by Chinese police in Solomon Islands, giving these demonstrations of how to do Shaolin Kung Fu, like literally teaching it even to children in the streets. And it spreads, you know, because kids are just like, awesome, and then they can go and watch the videos. You know, is it just because it's so appealing and what are some of the crazier things that are getting promoted as part of this? I read in your thing that they were even beauty pageants being promoted through the Shaolin Temple.

 

Chien-Peng Chung  04:44

I read somewhere that there was a beauty pageant in Melbourne, and some you know kung fu masters, perhaps from Shaolin were invited to demonstrate kung fu. I suppose they know, well, there’s nothing wrong with that, I suppose, like it adds colour to the pageant, but, okay, well, why is kung fu so popular? Well, no, why is it promoted by Shaolin? Well, because it’s popular, right? You know, at least, you know, since the time of, you know Bruce Lee, you know and Jackie Chan. Everyone in the world sees this as a kind of, how should I say, Chinese soft power, if you like. Besides reflexology, I suppose you know, this is the biggest soft power export for the Chinese. I suppose the original idea was that, you know, if you just sit down and keep chanting and reading, you know, the sutras or the press, you know, your body weakens, you see, so you have to, you know, kind of get into, you know, calisthenic exercises or Kung Fu, right? So, it sells very well, I suppose, you know, not only in Africa, but also in Europe and also in the South Pacific and in Australia, I'm sure.

 

Louisa Lim  06:03

Gareth, I mean, it seems counterintuitive that the Communist Party might have an interest in promoting Buddhism overseas and using Shaolin Temple as a vehicle, in this way, a sort of soft power vehicle. I mean, what do you think are the factors behind that?

 

Gareth Fisher  06:19

First of all, this is not something new, it's… the newness is the scale of it. But the Chinese, really, we can go back 100 years, when it was the Republic of China, there was an interest in using aspects of Chinese heritage, including Chinese religious heritage, to promote China's soft power. And even in the 1950s and early 1960s during the era of when Mao Zedong was chairman of the Communist Party, which people associate with a time where religion was very strictly controlled. But even during that time, there was a lot of interest in opening up certain kinds of heritage temple sites for foreign visitors, especially from predominantly Buddhist countries, as a form of diplomacy. I think the newness now is it’s not just bringing foreign powers in to see those select sites within China, but it’s actually exporting mainland Chinese Buddhism to the world. I think the question is, to what extent is the Chinese Communist Party interested in Buddhism as a religion that is, as a belief system? And different scholars have different opinions. I'm now actually finalising another book, and my opinion is very much that they're not very interested in it as a belief system, and that this is taking some aspects of it. I won't call them superficial, because I think that's unfair. They’re deeply rooted. They’re part of the richness of Chinese culture and history. But they’re not related to a kind of belief in the supernatural, which many of the people that I approach as research, the best part of my research in China, they’re interested in that, not really as a moral or ethical system. Although some of that may inevitably see power. It will be interesting to see, as the soft power initiative develops, whether the Chinese government sort of inadvertently also exports some aspects of Buddhism it is less interested in as it actually moves into other countries.

 

Louisa Lim  08:33

So it’s opportunistic?

 

Gareth Fisher  08:35

Yes, yeah.

 

Graeme Smith  08:36

Gareth, up front, I have to ask you about the lead exporter, if you like, of Chinese Buddhism, this guy called Shi Yongxin, who’s the abbot of Shaolin Temple, and has been for many decades.[i] I mean, in his heyday, he was on the National People's Congress. Jiang Zemin put him on the National People's Congress. But about ten years ago, he got bogged down in some pretty serious scandals around finances and even allegedly having a couple of children out of wedlock. I mean, given that scandal, I mean, why is he still in the job? You know, given that he's the face of this big push?

 

Gareth Fisher  09:10

Politics is not my main area of expertise, so I'm going to be a bit speculative. But he has the right connections, and he has really, what the Party is interested in, is someone who is loyal and also someone who is entrepreneurial and has the right connections to spread Buddhist culture, as they call it, in the way that they want it to be spread. China is not a democracy, so there's not really so much of an influence of a court of public opinion over these figures. There is to some degree, but to a far lesser degree than we would find in the West. So, if the loyalty to the Party is the most important thing, or certainly if you can demonstrate that loyalty, and then if you have the acumen to put the Party's vision into effect, right? Which, which he clearly does.

 

Louisa Lim  10:03

And it's not just Shaolin, is it? CP, you've written about various other Buddhist and Buddhism-related projects that Chinese state is bankrolling. I mean, tell us a bit about the scale of that?

 

Chien-Peng Chung  10:18

Well, talking about the monks, well, they are definitely politically savvy. You can, even, you know, consider them to be, you know, Party cadres, actually, or maybe non-Party cadres who are loyal to the to the Party. And also, at the same time, you know, very entrepreneurial, as you know, Professor Fisher has said, the kind of temple, you know, establishments in China, not just, you know, Shaolin, but also Long Quan Temple 龙泉寺, the dragon spring. That concern, put it that way, is also when doing very well, you know, in places like Tanzania, in places like Botswana, where they are building temples there. And I'm right now doing some research work on that. Well then you see, you know, the connections between the local Chinese embassies and officials there, how they get involved in the building and the patronage of these local temples. Because you need to get the permission from the Zambian government or the Tanzanian or the Botswana governments. Although because of laws in China, you cannot take the money from Longquan or Shaolin, and then you know, just, you know, you just give the money to the African countries to build temples. But they're usually done by businessmen who are doing business in those countries as a form of donation. But of course, this kind of donation could help the Chinese government further its diplomatic influence in these countries. So although the money actually comes from them, they may be rewarded in some way.

 

Louisa Lim  12:22

But you've done some work, haven't you, on Buddhist diplomacy in the Belt and Road and it seems that an awful lot of money has been spent bankrolling projects in places like Nepal, where apparently the government spent $3 billion reviving Buddha's birthplace and at various Belt and Road stops. Can you talk a little bit about how the state is yoking those two projects together?

 

Chien-Peng Chung  12:48

The more famous, you know, part of it was, of course the economic investments, right, the infrastructure projects. But also, it's always good, you know, if you can tie in something, I suppose, spiritual, right, religious or some kind of soft power, power of persuasion, right? So, it's not naked force, or naked money. And certainly the airport at Lumbini.

 

Louisa Lim  13:14

Which is Buddha's birthplace, right?

 

Chien-Peng Chung  13:16

That's right, yeah. And of course, then you have hotels there to cater to the tourist or what not. Because that is something that the governments of both Nepal and China can capitalise on. Yeah, right, you know, just as you know, in Sri Lanka, right, and other Belt and Road country, the telecommunication tower, I think, is known as the Lotus Tower, right, given the symbol of the lotus, right, in the in Buddhism, right? How you can arise from the soil, from the mud, you know, and yet, remain pure, or something like that, right, that kind of thinking, right? You know some China, Sri Lankan, you know, Buddhist, a Friendship Association, or something like that, which is very active. When it comes to providing a charity, or it's usually done by taking things from the Chinese embassy and then giving it to the temples or the monasteries, and then getting them to distribute those provisions, humanitarian aid, schoolbooks, or charity stuff and things like that. Of course everyone will know, you know that those things that are provided, you know, by the monks or by the temples or whatnot, actually comes from China and the Chinese Embassy. All right, that’s no secret.

 

Graeme Smith  14:34

Gareth, can I ask you maybe a bit about the bureaucracy of this push, because there's been a bit of a change. The Religious Affairs Bureau used to run all this sort of stuff, and now they're very much under the United Front. How does a body such as the Buddhist Association of China, are they sort of a passive vector for United Front work, or are they kind of an a thing all to themselves?

 

Gareth Fisher  14:56

Well, they're certainly not a thing all to themselves. But it would also be a mistake to see them simply as a passive vector. There are many monks and nuns in China, as well as also many lay practitioners who have a desire to missionize Buddhism, both to people within China who are largely ignorant of it. And there's a lot of people like that in a very secular society and also overseas. So, it's very difficult to tell to what extent someone in the Chinese Buddhist Association, who may be a senior monastic, is simply doing what the government wants them to do, and how much that's also what they want to do. And they again, have a desire to use this as a means of spreading Buddhism as a religion, or at least some aspects of it. Buddhists take a very flexible view about belief. So, for instance, I've spent many hours at temples where people come in, give offerings, pray for business wealth, and then leave the temple. And then I, myself, or perhaps a very zealous lay person, will ask the monks and say, well, how can you tolerate these people coming into the temple? And the monks will say, well, because they're having that basic relationship with the Buddha, they've just kind of started their acquaintance with the Buddha, right? They had this yuanfen 缘分 [fate] or fuyuan 福缘[good fortune] with the Buddha, right? So that they're just starting, and maybe nine lifetimes from now, they'll really become a devoted believer, or they'll become a monk. So, this is the same strategy that is in as part of the soft power. Maybe people will in Tanzania will just learn about meditation, and they won't really learn the essence of Buddhist teachings, but they will start to form that relationship with the Buddha, right? So, then the Chinese Buddhist Association thinks, if we help the government, we certainly can't resist them. So, if we help them, maybe that will be something good for the Dharma. Maybe that will spread Buddhism in some good way. But it's hard to know. I certainly again have met again many monastic entrepreneurs, and a lot of them are not well known or famous, and most of my research is on very non-famous people, but they still have that same kind of ambition that the famous monastics have. They want to spread Buddhism, and they want to think strategically about ways that they can do that.

 

Graeme Smith  17:30

Could you maybe give an example of one of these, or one of your favourite non-famous people that you've looked into and how they've gone about pursuing either wealth or Buddhism?

 

Gareth Fisher  17:41

Yeah so in my book, the book that I'm currently writing, not the one that's published, I spend a chapter with a monk that I've known for over 20 years who is trying to build a series of temples that combine Chinese Buddhist belief with traditional Chinese medicine and Western psychology, all as a kind of cocktail for healing, you know, one's inner spiritual self, if you like, and also one's body. And thinking of this in a holistic and very non-secular kind of way, where religion is really integrated with secular healing practices. And I follow him around as he meets with local officials, he meets with tourism management companies, he meets with zealous lay Buddhists who have money to devote to the project and other not very wealthy lay Buddhists who might just like sweep up and help and cook meals for all the important people, right? And there's all these people that I'm following around and getting to know and this has been an ambitious project. He's been doing it for 12 or 13 years. He has a plan to build a whole network of temples like this all over China. But to this day, he has not built and laid one stone of one temple in one place, right? And it's not simply a pipe dream. He really has had these meetings, but it's a very, very complicated process. And I can see firsthand how the politics of it are immensely complicated, right? So, you can get someone with enough money, you can get local officials who are enthusiastic, and yet still the provincial government doesn't want to approve it, or the national government doesn't want to approve it. And then you're back to square one. Or everything looks good, but then something goes wrong with the site, or one of the tourism managers that he knew had a family problem and then had to pull out of the whole business in this other province where they were trying to build this temple. So, there are a lot of… it's a very, very complicated process. But he is still enthusiastic and sticks to his vision. And he has a very small community of lay people who support and believe in him and he's still going forward to try and make this project a reality.

 

Louisa Lim  20:08

I was really struck to read that we are halfway through the five-year plan for the sinicization of Buddhism, and apparently this means adapting Buddhism to socialist core values and promoting humanistic Buddhism above everything else. I mean, I guess it's question for both of you, but let's start with you CP. I mean, to what extent is Buddhism being politicised, and the Buddhist Association of China working as a sort of political vector to propagate a particular kind of socialist-inspired Buddhism?

 

Chien-Peng Chung  20:51

The Buddhist Association of China was set up way back in 1953, I believe, so it has always, you know, been political vector. I suppose you're asking me, is Buddhism a political issue in China? Yes and no. If you are talking about civilization, then you know, Chinese Buddhism has been more or less sinicized, and over the last, you know, 2000 years, you know, since you know, it came from India and Central Asia. However, we are talking about Han, Chinese Buddhism, here you see. But if you are talking about Tibetan Buddhism, which is another variant of Buddhism, that is something that is, you know, very carefully watched by the Chinese government because it is Tibetan Buddhism, a single characteristic of the Tibetan people. And some, you know, Tibetan people, especially the followers of the Dalai Lama, and perhaps, you know, residing overseas, they hold, like to promote Tibetan nationalism, or self-determination, or self-government, independence, or whatever you call it. And then, of course, you know Tibetan Buddhism being headed, you know, by the Dalai Lama would be, you know, a salient characteristic Buddhism, especially Tibetan Buddhism, practised by the Tibetans would be a political issue, and is, and has been, the political issue. But if they are practised by the Han Chinese, you see Han Chinese going into, you know, Tibetan Buddhist temples, you know, in the the provinces of China, or the major cities of China outside Tibet, well, at least no big deal, right? China is a place of, you know, temples that they're practically everywhere, okay, so sinicization from my viewpoint, from the way I look at it, is not so a sinicization of religion is not so much you know, for the Han Chinese, but rather, you know, for the ethnic minorities. You know, like not just Tibetan Buddhism, for Tibetans, but also Islam, for the Xinjiang Uyghurs, you know, but you know, probably, probably Christianity, you know, Catholicism. You know Protestantism might be somewhat sensitive if practised by the Han Chinese, because you know, you know, they may be, you know, directed towards the pope in the Vatican or you know, you know European countries, or North American countries, or whatever, not, rather than China itself. But you know, the numbers are not that big. You know the Christian population. But for the Buddhist sinicization, at least you know, from, from my point of view, is that it's more for the you know, Tibetans or ethnic minorities.

 

Graeme Smith  24:08

Gareth, I have to ask you, one of my strongest memories is being with a Tibetan Buddhist friend out near Xiahe in Gansu Province, and seeing how much Tibetan Buddhism had been corrupted within China. I mean, they were driving Audis. They were having tantric sessions with local sex workers, all kinds of things. But I mean, how do ordinary Chinese view Tibetan Buddhism, and in what ways could that be a concern for the Chinese state?

 

Gareth Fisher  24:36

I mean, I think most ordinary Chinese know very little about Tibetan Buddhism, but there is a segment of the Chinese, urban Chinese population, Han Chinese population, that has become very interested in Tibetan Buddhism. And I do think that that does concern the state, and the state has tried to rein that in various ways, although I have it on some good sources they're not completely successful in doing so. And I think the thing that concerns the state is not so much the number of Han Chinese interested in Tibetan Buddhism, but the degree to which it is a social of rather affluent and well-educated segment of the population that has developed this interest, and even some with significant political standing. So there was, I think, about 10 years ago now, a BBC report that showed a video of a high-ranking communist official talking to the Dalai Lama. And that was a surprise to a lot of people, but not to us who study Buddhism in China, because we've seen this interest develop over the years. And this has been going, I mean, in some ways, it goes back a long time. It goes back even before the People's Republic, but certainly in its most recent incarnation, it has been very popular over the last, really, 25 or 30 years. So, I think one of the sinicization goals is to kind of control this in some fashion. And even Han Chinese Buddhism is not unaffected by sinicization, because sinicization sometimes means making things more Chinese. But it also means making things more in the line with the Party and what it wants and how it defines what China is. So there have been some restrictions. I mean, one of the most common examples is it was popular in the 2010s, for a lot of Buddhists to set up summer camps in temples for children. It started with kind of youth and 20 somethings and teens, and then it became younger and younger. And the euphemism was, well, we're not teaching Buddhism, we're teaching traditional Chinese values, right? But the state, kind of under sinitization, has put a lot more restrictions, not completely restricted it, but it's put a lot more restrictions. So the state is even concerned about the spread of Han Chinese Buddhism among the urban population, particularly in ways that it cannot control. So I do agree with CP, the effect is much greater on Christianity, Islam and Tibetan Buddhism, but there is some effect on all religious practice in China.

 

Louisa Lim  27:12

I remember when I was reporting in China, I did a story on female Imams. Because in Gansu and elsewhere, there were these temples which have female imams, something which is not allowed anything anywhere else in the world, but they're actually licenced in China. And other Muslims actually disapprove of this innovation, and that sort of leads to a kind of devaluation of Chinese Islam. Do you think there are similar forces at play when it comes to Buddhism?

 

Gareth Fisher  27:47

Not really, in a way, I mean, and not something that would be sort of so far beyond the pale. I mean, Buddhism is not a very doctrinaire religion. You see in the media a lot of times. And this has been going on for decades now, these articles about how Buddhism in China is commercially corrupted, but you can go back to the fifth century and Buddhist monasteries were at the centre of finance and business. They were important ways in which people were linked translocally to other places. Many commercial practices and traditions in Chinese history were introduced through Buddhism. And if you go back to India, Buddhists were heavily connected with commerce, even if Buddhist monks were not allowed to handle money. So, the temples in all Buddhist countries have people that come to make offerings that pray for fame and wealth. You’ll see that all throughout the world. So, China is not an outstanding example or exception in that regard, and as I said earlier, it’s generally the view of most Chinese Buddhists that if there's any way that you can get in the door and start at relationship with the Buddha, then that's good. So, it's not a kind of religion that says, oh, there are these practices that absolutely cannot be allowed, right, and in China, it's all being corrupted, that's really not the case. And…

 

Chien-Peng Chung  29:20

It's never too late to accumulate merits, I suppose.

 

Graeme Smith  29:26

And you have to share your merits! I mean, CP, can I maybe get a little bit to why there's been this change in the temperature, if you like, when there have been very different changes in temperature elsewhere in Chinese politics. I mean, we had this incredible speech in 2014 Xi Jinping gave at UNESCO when he talked about the impact of Buddhism on China. And it’s really kind of the first time a PRC leader has given such a pro-religious speech. In the WikiLeak cables around it, they said that quote, he seemed to be “quite taken with Buddhist mysticism and fascinated by Buddhist martial arts and mystical kind of powers.” I mean, do you think that part of the revival, as it was rumoured to be, under Jiang Zemin, is about the leader's personal preference?

 

Chien-Peng Chung  30:12

For Xi Jinping, it is somewhat of his preference. While he was a government official in Hebei, he was a fast friend with one of the monks who later became an abbot in Zhengding City in Hebei, or something like that. Yeah. And it has been rumoured that his wife is a believer in Buddhism, and his mother was buried in Tibetan Buddhism rites. Certainly, I mean, Xi Jinping sponsored a provincial level, you know, Buddhist gathering. I think it's the World Buddhist Forum when he was the Party leader of Zhejiang, I think way back in 2006 or something like that. And so far there has been, you know, a five or six, you know, of theseBuddhist forums, where international personages are being invited to China. So that was really well before he was, you know, President or Party Secretary. That was 2006. So, he was the Party secretary of Zhejiang, yeah, so, so I was thinking to myself, when would a Communist leader, leader of a Communist country or Marxist, Leninist Party that is officially atheist require religion or Buddhism and in order to promote his own career? So, right? If that is not the case then, then, I suppose you know it does come out of his own personal belief, in some sense, at least you know belief in cause and effect. I suppose it could be like a lot of Chinese the desire to know, accumulate some merits you know for your future career or your future fortune. You know, not necessarily your next life, but also, something good happening in this life, in the future years here in this world. So, I think it's something personal for him. Like you see the way he dealt with the economy, you know, it’s a major complaint of his right? You know that the Chinese people should not be too materialistic, right? You know that buying a piece of property or house is for the purpose of living in it, and not, you know, for the purpose of speculation or whatnot. So, I think you know Buddhism, you know, I think kind of appeal, you know, to his, his personality, in a way.

 

Graeme Smith  32:48

I mean, Gareth. I know we're in the realm of speculation here, but it's kind of fun. And, you know, it is remarkable that his father was the one who oversaw the first, if you like, be thawing of the state suppression of Buddhism, way back in 1980 when Xi Zhongxun was in charge of basically, religious affairs. I mean, what’s your take on it?

 

Gareth Fisher  33:08

It's difficult to tell whether all the rumours that we’ve just heard are true or not, but it's certainly true that he, I don't think he's opposed to Buddhism. I think he's interested in some aspect of Buddhism, how far that goes is, again in the realm of speculation. And I think he sees Buddhism potentially as solving a lot of problems for China, right? One is the values problem, which he is worried about materialism. And this is also someone who came to power largely with the promise to root out corruption, which many in China, I think, including President Xi himself, feels was a partly a values problem, right? And so, if we go back to traditional Chinese values, which can come from Buddhism or Confucianism or Taoism, then that can be a potential solution to the problem. And I think there are many in the Chinese Communist, the atheist Chinese Communist Party, who have an interest in Buddhism of one sort or another, but there is always the feeling that the Party has to be in control. And I do know Buddhists, many Buddhists that I've studied were very, very excited when Xi made the speech in in 2015 that you're referring to. But then toward the end of the decade, with the sinicization policies, I think some of them became a bit more disillusioned and feeling okay, this is really not an opening for Buddhist to really influence, really be in the driver's seat, to influence the direction of the country. The Party is in the driver's seat. And whatever it wants to take from Buddhism, then it's going to take that right? And so, there was a degree of disappointment about that. I think that's something you're always going to see with Chinese Communist Party leaders, you know. Whatever they might personally think it's hard for us to know, but certainly in their public use of religion, they're not against it. They haven't really been against it since the 1980s but they see it as a means to an end. But it's a bit like nuclear power, right? You know you want to have your, it's clean energy, if you can make it, but if something goes wrong, you're in a lot of trouble, right? And I think that's how the Party sees religions like Buddhism, it's okay. It can do a lot of good things for China, for Chinese soft power, for teaching people values, but as long as the Party is in control, right? So, the summer camps I just discussed, you know, then the Party wasn't in control. The individual Buddhist entrepreneurs were in control. And they were sort of saying things that the Party was saying. But they also had a different kind of agenda, which was really socialising, some of them anyway, really socialising these young children into Buddhist ideas. And so that was something the Party was not completely comfortable with. So, it's something the Party wants to use, but it's always very careful about it.

 

Louisa Lim  36:16

I remember when I was in China, I went to the 1,050th birthday of Mazu 妈祖, who's the deity who's supposed to protect fishermen, very popular in Taiwan. And it was really striking that there was a huge procession all kinds of events, but sitting in the centre of the podium was the local Communist Party Secretary of mayor the island, and I interviewed him, and he told me that he worshipped Mazu, but it was okay, because Mazu is not a religion, it's a popular belief. Do you think the Party is using the syncretic nature of Buddhism to tread that careful line, or is it changing its stance on religion or popular religion?

 

Gareth Fisher  37:06

I think it can do that at times. But again, I think it’s cautious about that. Because again, if you're a Party official, and you say that that's one thing. But if you're an organisation that really your main goal is to spread Buddhism or spread popular religion, and then you just say, everything we're doing is about culture and popular belief. It's not about religion. You might get away with that to a certain point, but if you become too big, then the Party is going to say, well, you don't decide what's culture and what's religion, we decide that right. And these terms are left vague very deliberately so that the Party can make whatever interpretations it wants in any given circumstance.

 

Chien-Peng Chung  37:51

I suppose, if these religious ceremonies or gatherings or festivals or whatnot, they are relatively unorganised or organised at the very, you know, small or low level, it doesn't frighten the Party. It doesn't make the Party worry about its control over a territory. Then, you know, the Party can still, well, and to tolerate, you know, this kind of, you know, behaviour. Just treat this as a joke. But you know, it might be a solution. You know, okay, to make the Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, you know, reincarnation of the Buddha, rebirth of the Buddha, then you'll be obeying the one and the same person you know at the same time, Party Secretary and President, and also the Buddha. So, something like, you know, the rebirth of Dalai Lama, or something like that, right? It's both secular and religious, right? Well, and that solves the problem, okay? Since most Han Chinese are nominally, Buddhist, you know, but you know that that's just a joke.

 

Graeme Smith  39:00

But, I mean, it's a question I've been trying to get to because if you look at China, there seems to be, if you like, a shift away from some of the aspects of communism towards a more nationalist approach. And if you look elsewhere in the region, you see Buddhist nationalism. You know, whether it's in Myanmar, you see in America, we have this Christian nationalism headed up by a man who couldn't quote a single Bible verse. And likewise, in Russia, we have the Orthodox Church being used as a vector for nationalism there. Is there any chance that Chinese Buddhism could be used in the same way?

 

Chien-Peng Chung  39:35

As we're seeing, you know, the Chinese government has been trying to co-opt, you know, the, you know, the religion of Buddhism. Because you know, in a way, it's a popular belief, right, something that the Chinese government can use for diplomatic purposes. And certainly, as you were saying, Graeme, you know, that is a salient, a nationalistic a national character, part, you know of Chinese culture. So to the extent that you can monitor it, you can control it. You can co-opt more popular, or more powerful, or wealthier monks or whatnot, within that structure of Party leadership, yes, you can use it as a tool of nationalism, if you wish, but you have to be very, just…

 

Graeme Smith  40:28

Gareth, what's your take?

 

Gareth Fisher  40:29

I agree with what CP said. I mean, one thing, I don't think you will see, I know I realise it was a joke, but I don't think you will see President Xi trying to say that, announcing that he's the reincarnation of a famous Buddha. You know in Chinese history that this happened once with the Empress Wu Zetian and then, but it didn’t happen a lot of times. And I think that's very telling. Because if you, if you start to... that crosses a line in a way, right and because, if you start to actually say that the power of the state is a kind of magical power, then you've, then you've crossed that line in any kind of way. And interestingly, when I was—I haven't encountered this much recently—when I was first doing research in the early 2000s there were some Buddhists I met who actually made claims that the State was really Buddhist, that it was secretly Buddhist, and that the leaders actually had a high degree of attainment within Buddhism. And one of the reasons that it didn't want people to practice Buddhism publicly, it was afraid that ordinary people could get the same power, the same essentially magical power that the State had, right? So, there are, and this is similar to conspiracy theories we would see in Western countries, right? There's ideas about, you know, Trump being secretly a very devout Christian. I mean, these, I’ve gone to conference presentations on this, and so I think that the state wants to be very careful that that it never gets to that point. Because then you really have a kind of underground religious force that kind of claims to represent the nation in some way but is operating under a different agenda to that of the state. So, there is a way, so the State is always very careful to, I think, use Buddhism in somewhat vague ways, right, as something that celebrates it, but nothing that ever has any whiff of magical power or belief or something religious and supernatural in some way. That is always kept carefully out of any kind of state-led discourse.

 

Graeme Smith  42:58

I mean, there's this gap between popular discourse and official discourse is fascinating on this. I mean, in the case of Falun Gong, you know, there was a popular belief that the state, in effect, was in negotiation with Falun Gong about how long the Communist Party would last. And, you know, so many people tell me, oh, Xi Jinping is definitely a meditator. And they cite the fact that when he's photographed in the National Hall of the People shaking hands, he always has exactly the same expression on his face regardless. Like, look, he must be a meditator. I mean, you know, does the popular perception, you know, change things in any way, or is it just kind of a bit of fun?

 

Gareth Fisher  43:33

I think at this stage, it's a bit of fun. But I think if these kind of beliefs become more widespread, then, and if the state can no longer control its own discourse about itself, then it becomes dangerous to the State. And Falun Gong is a strong example of that, right? That's an example from recent history. But if you go back into Chinese history hundreds of years there are many examples of this kind of religious charismatic force that starts to speak for the State or speak for the government. There is not a traditional gap between the religion in the State in Chinese history and in the mindset of many Chinese people. So even though I would argue China is a profoundly secular country, on the one hand, in that religion is very invisible in public space. In the minds of both the government and the people, there isn't a categorical distinction between religious or sacred power and political power in the way that a Western-educated person would argue right or would think about kind of. So, the State is always very careful not to feed any kind of charismatic popular interest in any kind of religion that could cause a disturbance to public order in some way.

 

Louisa Lim  45:06

Given China’s economic situation, and this sort of quite recent interest in Buddhism and spirituality amongst China’s Gen Z, who are, you know, basically, in search of values. Is there a danger that, actually, that embrace of Buddhism, that the state has maybe been encouraging to channel social discontent, that it could actually go too far? Maybe Gareth you first.

 

Gareth Fisher  45:36

Yeah, it's very interesting. Yeah, sure, there is a danger. Again, it's like my nuclear power metaphor, right? You never know when it's going to become a little bit too much and ignite something. There is, as you say, a lot of discontent. And there could, religion can just as easily be the source of political resistance as anything else. As again, we saw an example of the Falun Gong. But I do think on the whole, the State is probably in a good position to have a lot of young people turning to Buddhism or turning to some kind of temple-based practice, because, again, religion is still very invisible in Chinese public space. So, if you're going to the temple to channel your discontent, you’re not channelling it in other ways. Clearly, Buddhism is not the main problem that the state is facing right now, right. There are a lot of much more concrete problems, as you've noted. So, Buddhism is probably more likely to be part of the solution for the State than part of the problem.

 

Louisa Lim  46:51

Chien Peng over to you. I mean, it is, although Gareth keeps saying Buddhism as religion is very invisible, it's still notable, isn't it that a country that has been officially atheist for decades, all these religious practices do have very deep roots, don't they? And historically, China has a tradition of, you know, charismatic sects exploding out of nowhere and becoming a political threat. Is there any danger of that now?

 

Chien-Peng Chung  47:20

It is and it isn't. Right now, I don't think there's anything to fear politically, you know, from Buddhism that is so long that, no, it doesn't, know, turn into a political force, no, like the Taiping Rebellion, right? You know, in the 19th century, where the leadership subscribe to some kind of followers as well, some kind of Christianity or whatnot, and use that as a governing agenda. That also could create another problem, because China is not, you know, not totally Buddhist, right? There are significant segments of the population that are Muslims, right? And also in the cities, there are Christians, there are a lot of atheists. So, I don't see a potent political danger from Buddhism, until and unless you know, it gets organised as a political force nationwide, which was the fear of Falun Gong by the leadership, right? You know, when you can get people, you know, I don't know how many thousands or tens of thousands to surround the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party building in Beijing, well, then that is a problem, right? But you know, no local festivals involving Mazu, or Guanyin or whatnot that you want to play to, you know, in the temples, I think so far the Chinese authorities are okay with it.

 

Graeme Smith  48:50

CP Gareth, thanks for joining us.

 

Chien-Peng Chung  48:51

Thanks for inviting me.

 

Gareth Fisher  48:52

Thank you. It's been a very interesting conversation.

 

Graeme Smith  48:55

You've been listening to the Little Red Podcast, bringing you China from beyond the Beijing beltway. Many thanks to our guests and to my co-host, Louisa Lim we're on air thanks to support from the Australian Centre on China and the world. Our editing is by Andy Hazel, background research by Wing Kuang. Our music is by Susie Wilkins, and our cartoons and gifts are courtesy of Seb Danta, bye for now you.

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